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1. Introduction
Viewed from the point of view of employment policy,
the rationale behind stressing the importance of life-
long upgrading of skills and competences is threefold.
First, technological and structural changes render jobs
and skills obsolete at such a rate that the slow renewal
of the labour force through the entry of young qualified
workers might not suffice to satisfy the demand for new
qualifications, thereby increasing the risk of skill short-
ages that, in a global economy, may depress employ-
ment (OECD, 1994, Chapter 7). Second, people with
low qualifications face higher unemployment prospects
or, in countries where they can price themselves into
jobs, a higher risk of being persistently in low pay and
often in poverty. Policies for initial education and adult
training can, therefore, be seen as complementary to
making-work-pay policies and job-search assistance as
regards to ‘minimising the number of people who do
not attain and maintain the skills required to command
earnings that bring them above the poverty threshold’
(OECD, 1999, p. 12). Third, as skills become outdated
more quickly than workers retire from the labour force,
there is a strong risk of older workers losing their cur-
rent jobs, while lacking the competencies to move into
new jobs. Indeed, since increasing labour market par-
ticipation of older workers has become a policy priority
of many industrialised countries, ‘promoting access to
training for all regardless of age and developing life-
long learning strategies, in particular workplace train-
ing for older workers’ (European Commission, 2004,
p. 46) has gained paramount attention.
It can be argued, however, that there is still little empir-
ical  evidence  that  can  support  the  policy-maker’s
emphasis on adult learning. The evidence on the impact
of  government  funded  training  programmes  for  the
unemployed is mixed (1). The evidence on the impact
of training for employed workers is essentially limited
to  its  average  effect  on  wages  and  productivity (2),
while only few studies look at the relationship between
employee training and employment security, and their
results  are  somewhat  inconclusive  due  to  selection
bias (3). Furthermore, the fact that, while workers’ par-
ticipation in education and training is relatively high in
certain  countries,  the  number  of  hours  of  training
received by each participant is much smaller than those
received  by  full-time  students  enrolled  in  front-end
education might cast doubts on how much a marginal
improvement  in  training  provision  can  affect  labour
market performance, in general, and, more specifically,
individual  and  aggregate  employment  perspectives.
Finally, deadweight and efficiency are seldom consid-
ered in the policy discourse.
This  paper  is  a  very  partial  attempt  to  contribute  to
bridge this gap. First, I use data from the European Com-
munity household panel to try to assess the effects of
adult education and training on individual labour market
performance. My findings seem to confirm that training
makes a difference. Although I find that employee train-
ing has a clear impact on wage growth only in the case
of young or highly educated employees, it appears to
have a stronger impact on employment security — at
least insofar as it is perceived by the workers — in the
case of both older and low-educated workers. To recon-
cile this apparent contradiction, we need to take into
account that training wage premia are estimated on a
censored sample including only employed workers. Due
to the existence of downward wage rigidity, one can
expect that those workers who are unable to maintain
their  productivity  (due,  for  instance,  to  skill  obsoles-
cence) are more frequently laid off — rather than expe-
riencing  a  fall  in  wages  and  be  retained  in  employ-
ment —  and  thereby  excluded  from  our  sample.  In
particular, it can be conjectured that, in the case of older
¥1∂ See for example Heckman et al. (1999), Martin and Grubb (2001), Layard
(2003), and Betcherman et al. (2004).
¥2∂ Two exceptions to be noted are Leuven and Oosterbeek (2004) and Aru-
lampalam et al. (2004a).
¥3∂ See Bishop (1997) and Ok and Tergeist (2003) amongst others.Par t   II I:  Adult   educat i on  and t r aini ng
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workers, training enables employers to match individual
productivity with constant individual wages and there-
fore retain the worker. Conversely, workers not receiv-
ing training are more likely to enter non-employment
because their productivity has fallen below their wage.
This argument can be generalised to all low-productivity
workers and suggests that, for those people who find it
more  difficult  to  price  themselves  into  jobs,  training
allows  attaining  and  maintaining  the  competences
required to match productivity and wages, thereby sus-
taining  their  employment  prospects.  Once  foregone
income  due  to  unemployment  spells  is  taken  into
account, it turns out that training positively affects earn-
ings at any age and level of educational attainment.
Second, by looking at the recent experience of many
industrialised countries, I argue that, to compensate for
the effect of possible market failures, which might jus-
tify training policy in spite of high ex post private return,
co-financing  arrangements —  under  which  govern-
ments,  employers  and/or  employees  jointly  finance
training — can better leverage the required resources to
upgrade  the  competences  of  those  in  employment.
Co-financing schemes, if carefully designed, can mini-
mise deadweight losses, although specific programmes
for the unemployed or the inactive might require full
government funding.
The paper is organised as follows: Section 2 sets forth and
estimates  a  simple  empirical  model  for  evaluating  the
effect of training on individual wages and subjective per-
ceptions of employment security. Section 3 discusses the
main  sources  of  market  failures  affecting  training  out-
comes and the empirical evidence on their relevance. Sec-
tion  4  explains  the  logic  underlying  the  co-financing
approach to training policy and reviews recent policy inno-
vation adopted in this area by several OECD countries.
Few concluding remarks are contained in the final section.106
2. Do workers benefit from training?
2.1. Empirical framework
The general empirical model used in this paper can be
considered an extension of that proposed by Loewen-
stein and Spletzer (1998). Denote with  the value for
the worker i of a job match with the firm j at time t. In
the simplest case this value can be seen as the stream of
expected revenues that the worker i can obtain from
being employed in firm j at time t. In a narrow sense we
can think of this value as the current wage. However,
more generally, this value may include the worker’s
valuation  of  his/her  employment  security  and/or
expected future wages. Our objective is to estimate the
effect on  of the stock of previously taken training
courses.
Whatever  the  precise  definition  of  ,  which  will
depend  on  the  specific  empirical  application,  let  us
assume that it can be written as
[1]
where   is a vector of time-varying individual char-
acteristics,  is the stock of training taken while work-
ing for the current employer,   the stock of training
taken while working for previous employers, while  ,
,   are year (or country per year) effects, individual
fixed effects and job-match-specific effects (with 
taking value   if the worker i has a job with firm j at
time t and 0 otherwise), respectively, and   is a stand-
ard random disturbance.
Assuming that [1] is valid, it is equivalent to ruling out
time-variant heterogeneity, which is not due to observ-
able characteristics (such as the training stock), the job-
match  or  a  serially  uncorrelated  random  disturbance.
The inclusion of an individual fixed effect in the empir-
ical specification allows identifying the coefficient of all
stock variables (such as training) for which only changes
within the sample period are observable (depreciation is
ruled  out  for  convenience).  However,  if  in  addition
match-specific  effects  are  included  in  the  empirical
specification, the impact of  , being invariant within
each specific job-match, cannot be identified.
Loewenstein and Spletzer (1998) show that if 
then estimating [1] by omitting match-specific effects
(but including individual fixed effects) would yield an
estimate  ,  provided  that  dummies  for  the
number of job changes are included in the specifica-
tion. Equivalently, the same result can be obtained by
estimating model [1] in first differences using OLS,
omitting  match-specific  effects  and  including  a
dummy for job change. Conversely, to obtain unbi-
ased estimates of  , job-match-specific means can be
subtracted from the stock of training taken with the
current employer. Indeed, corr  by
construction  (   denoting  the  job-match-specific
mean of  ).
2.2. The data
I use longitudinal data from the 2003 release of the
European Community household panel (ECHP). This
survey provides a wealth of information on individual
income and socioeconomic characteristics for 15 EU
countries and aims to be representative, both in cross-
sections and longitudinally. Due to the common ques-
tionnaire, the information contained in the ECHP is,
in principle, comparable across countries, which is its
main strength. Moreover, releases of the ECHP con-
tain additional longitudinal data from other sources
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economic  panel  (SOEP)  and  the  British  household
panel  survey  (BHPS),  whose  questions  are  made
comparable with those of the ECHP questionnaire.
The main question on vocational training in the ECHP
is  as  follows  ‘Have  you  at  any  time  since  January
(year before the survey year) been in any vocational
education or training, including part-time and short
courses?’. From this question, a dichotomous variable
‘participation in vocational training’, which takes the
value 1 if the individual responded ‘yes’ and 0 if he/
she responded ‘no’, is constructed. Conditional on a
positive answer, the individual is asked to report addi-
tional information on the last course only (including
duration  but,  in  the  case  of  education  courses,  not
including whether the course was paid for or provided
by  the  employer).  The  distinction  between  formal
education and vocational training is based on the cat-
egories used by national labour force surveys.
In the year of the interview, the stock of vocational
training and formal education is increased by 1 if the
individual reported to have participated in one of them
in the period covered by that interview. Each training
stock is further decomposed in two aggregates: train-
ing taken with the current employer and training taken
with previous employers. Due to the scattered nature
of  the  information  on  course  duration  (with  many
missing  values  for  many  countries),  start  and  end
dates are not used for the analysis of this paper. This
has two consequences. First, training reported in one
interview is attributed to belong to the period between
that interview and the previous one, although it might
have been taken before the latter. This is equivalent to
increasing the risk of false reporting, which, as shown
by Frazis and Loewenstein (1999), is likely to bias
returns towards zero. Second, training reported in one
interview is considered to have been taken with the
current employer at the time of the interview. If, at a
given interview, the individual says he/she has sepa-
rated from the employer he/she was working for at the
time of the previous interview, the training reported in
previous  interviews  as  training  with  the  current
employer is added to the stock of training taken with
previous employers and the stock of training with the
current employer is re-set to either 0 or 1 (depending
on  whether  any  training  is  reported  in  the  current
interview). Additional information on the data used is
reported in the appendix.
2.3. Empirical results
Training wage premia
There are various ways to compute a training wage
premium (1). The simplest method, when longitudinal
data are available, is to compare wage growth rates (2)
between  two  interviews  for  workers  receiving/not
receiving training between the same two interviews.
This procedure already controls for time-invariant het-
erogeneity without resorting to sophisticated regression
techniques. Chart 1 shows simple average measures of
the wage premium computed along these lines, by pool-
ing together all countries and years for which the infor-
mation is available.
Cross-country  differences  in  the  bivariate  training–
wage  growth  relationship  are  large  (ranging  from
wages 0.1 % greater after participation in some educa-
tion and training in France and the United Kingdom to
wages 4.5 % greater in Portugal). Raw training premia
are  lower  in  many  countries  when  computed  with
respect to vocational training only (excluding educa-
tion), but remain positive in all but three countries
(Belgium, Ireland and the United Kingdom). On aver-
age, the bivariate training–wage growth relationship
seems to decline with age and educational attainment,
although this pattern is much less evident in the case
of vocational training only. Finally, contrary to what
is suggested by simulation exercises based on cross-
section  information  only  (see  OECD,  2003b),  once
individual  heterogeneity  is  controlled  for,  training
wage premia seem to be lower for women than for
men, possibly due to heterogeneity in the quality of
training courses and/or occupational gender segrega-
tion (see OECD, 2002).
As  discussed  above,  workers  employed  by  high-per-
forming establishments (for example those belonging to
more innovative firms) might receive more training and
experience faster wage growth. Furthermore, for policy
purposes, it is important to know whether workers’ ben-
¥1∂ The economic literature is crowded with empirical results on the issue. See
Bishop (1997), Leuven (2003) and Ok and Tergeist (2003) for recent sur-
veys. Among the papers not covered by these review articles, see also Par-
ent  (1999)  and  Hill  (2001),  Kurosawa  (2001),  Hui  and  Smith  (2002),
Schøne (2002), Gerfin (2003), Kuckulenz and Zwick (2003) and Arulam-
palam et al. (2004a) for the USA, Japan, Canada, Norway, Switzerland,
Germany, and European Union countries, respectively. For Canada, see
also OECD (2003b), although the estimates contained in this study refer
only to individuals who actually upgraded their formal education diploma.
¥2∂ The wage concept used in this paper is gross hourly wage in the main job,
including paid overtime and overtime hours.Qualit y and e f f icie ncy  in educat ion
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efits  from  training  are  transferable  across  jobs  and
employers. This is particularly important in the context
of  policy  reforms  geared  towards  making  the  labour
market more flexible and the resource allocation more
rapid and smoother. Chart 2 decomposes the raw training
premia  presented  above  into  the  premium  to  training
Chart 1: Wage growth difference between trained and untrained employees, by country 
and by labour market group
(1) Percentage-point difference in average annual wage growth rates between employees receiving training between two interviews and those not receiving
it. Figures are adjusted to take into account that the time spell between two interviews can be different from one year. Data refer to wage and salary
workers aged 25–54 years and working more than 15 hours per week.
(2) Estimates based on the countries shown in Panel A.
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taken with the current employer — estimated by correct-
ing for match-specific heterogeneity (1) — and the pre-
mium to training taken with previous employers, while
Table 1 presents fully-fledged multivariate estimates of
the training premia, after correcting also for changes in
observable individual and firm characteristics (2).
In all countries for which data are available, continuous
education  and  training  taken  with  previous  employers
have, on average, a positive impact on wages, although
this impact is not always significant in Belgium, Italy and
Portugal. Using the most reliable model (Table 1), parti-
cipating in formal education and training in one year is
estimated to increase earnings by up to 5.8 % (in Austria).
Workers usually reap a lower (and sometimes insignifi-
cant) premium while staying with the same employer.
These  results  are  also  broadly  confirmed  when  wage
premia to training and education are estimated separately,
although  estimates  are  less  precise —  and  somewhat
lower in the case of vocational training (3). The fact that
the  wage  premium  to  training  taken  with  previous
employers is smaller in the case of vocational training
than  in  the  case  of  formal  education  is  not  surprising
because competences acquired through formal education
are more easily signalled and recognised. Accreditation
and recognition of competences acquired through short
vocational training spells and informal training is indeed a
crucial issue (and policy problem) for the transferability of
training (see below).
Overall, these findings are consistent with previous stud-
ies that typically find the training premium increases in
the  aftermath  of  a  job  change  (see  Loewenstein  and
Spletzer, 1998, 1999 and Parent, 1999, for the USA;
Fougère et al., 2001, for France; Blundell et al., 1999,
and Booth and Bryan, 2002, for the United Kingdom;
and Gerfin, 2003, for Switzerland). These papers tend to
interpret  the  fact  that  the  training  wage  premium
increases in the aftermath of job change as evidence of
employers’ market power (I will get back to this point in
Section 3). However, there are at least two other possible
explanations. First, the training firm does not always
have a high-pay position to offer to the trained worker.
In this case — if competences acquired through training
are  transferable  —  trained  workers  may  have  better
options outside the firm. Second, workers might accept
to be paid less than their marginal product in the current
job  if  they  are  sensitive  to  reciprocity.  In  particular,
workers might interpret the firm’s investment in general
training as a kind action which deserves reward. Antici-
pating this, the firm might invest more in general train-
ing than it would have done in the presence of purely
opportunistic behaviour. Consistent with the latter expla-
nation, Leuven et al. (2004) use Dutch data to show that
the probability of receiving employer-sponsored training
for workers that are greatly sensitive to reciprocity is
15 % higher than for workers who are not ready to recip-
rocate.
Looking at the pooled country sample and breaking this
sample by labour market groups is instructive in many
respects. First, the wage premium to participating in train-
ing in one previous year while already working for the
current employer has an impact which is relatively homo-
geneous across groups (about 1 %), with in most cases a
lower premium to formal education than to vocational
training. Although this finding is partially due to too few
education spells in the sample, it might be also ascribed to
the fact that adults enrol in general education to qualify for
different jobs rather than to improve the competencies
they can use within the same job or occupation. Second,
the impact of vocational training on wages seem to be
transferable  across  jobs  only  in  the  case  of  relatively
young and/or high educated workers, while the pattern is
less clear for formal education, again partially due to the
lack of precision of the estimates because of the limited
number of education spells in the sample.
Should one conclude that education and training does
not lead to a durable economic return for other catego-
ries, and particularly for those who have already lower
¥1∂ Match-specific  effects  on  wage  premia  to  training  taken  with  current
employers are eliminated by subtracting job-match-specific means from
the stock of training taken with the current employer. A sensitivity analysis
(not presented here) was undertaken by estimating wage equations with
job-match  fixed  effects,  and  revealed  that  the  two  procedures  give
extremely  close  results  as  regards  to  training  taken  with  the  current
employer. As far as training taken with previous employers is concerned,
there is less need to correct for the effect of match-specific events because,
as shown by Loewenstein and Spletzer (1998), to the extent that returns to
training taken with previous employers are no smaller than those to train-
ing taken with the current employers, the former are underestimated.
¥2∂ Controlling for changes in observable characteristics allows partial correc-
tion for other sources of time-variant heterogeneity. However, it is cau-
tious to compare this model with simpler ones without covariates (such as
the model behind Chart 12) because, if returns to training are heterogene-
ous and selection bias is not fully eliminated by including match-specific
effects, mis-specification of the linear regression model may result in large
estimation biases (see, for example, Lalonde, 1986, Heckman et al., 1999,
and Smith and Todd, 2004). A more sophisticated approach to correct for
time-variant heterogeneity and selection bias would be to use instrumental
variables. However, the difficulty to find appropriate instruments makes
this approach infrequent in the literature, the only example known to us
being an unpublished paper by Blundell et al. (1999).
¥3∂ Still, in both specifications, they are significant at the 10 % level in almost
all countries for which separate premia could be estimated (to limit the risk
of unreliability, country-specific estimates are not computed when there
are less than 100 individuals who received some training before a job
change within the sample window and/or when these individuals represent
less than 2 % of the sample of individuals).Qualit y and e f f icie ncy  in educat ion
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earnings, greater employment insecurity as well as more
imperfect  access  to  training  opportunities?  As  said
above, this conclusion would be unwarranted. In fact,
these returns are biased by the fact that the sample is cen-
sored:  they  are  computed  only  for  workers  that  are
employed,  excluding  persons  that  are  expelled  from
employment. To put it another way, these estimates do
not take into account the impact of training on employ-
ment prospects and on containing the loss of income
associated with unemployment spells.
Chart 2:  Training premia, by country and training history (1)
*, **, *** Statistically signiﬁcant at 1% level, 5% level and 10% level, respectively.
(1) Estimates of the wage premium of participating in training in one additional year obtained from the estimation of a simple wage equation with addi-
tional controls only for individual ﬁxed effects, the number of previous jobs and interaction terms between country dummies, year dummies and date of
interview. Training taken with the current employer has been demeaned by subtracting job-match-speciﬁc means. Wage premia to training and formal
education are estimated through a speciﬁcation that simultaneously includes both variables.
Source: Own calculations based on the European Community household panel, waves 1 to 7 (1994–2000).
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Training and the perception of employment security
In the literature, the term employment insecurity is gen-
erally used to denote the risk that a worker will experi-
ence a significant fall in earnings (and/or well-being)
due to job loss or the threat of it (see Nickell et al., 2002;
see also Green, 2003, for a more extensive concept). Job
loss is intended to refer to separations that are involun-
tary from the perspective of the worker. In practice, this
means that employment security is composed of two ele-
ments: the likelihood of maintaining the employment
relationship  with  unmodified  working  conditions
(including pay) and the expected cost of job loss, which,
in turn, can be seen as the product of the probability of
job loss and its cost conditional on losing the job.
Table 1





















Denmark 1.60* 0.87* 4.39* 0.17 2.26* 0.78
Netherlands 0.48 0.44 6.12* 0.23 2.78** 0.58
Belgium 2.30*** 1.84* –1.20 –1.84 2.12*** 1.57*
Ireland 3.31*** 0.21 6.15* 0.67 4.46* 0.39
Italy .. .. .. .. 1.65 2.21*
Spain 3.83* 0.32 5.99* 0.20 5.05* 0.24
Portugal .. .. .. .. 2.41 2.98*
Austria .. .. .. .. 5.81* 0.88**
Finland 2.78* 0.66** 2.70*** 1.22*** 3.47* 0.83*
Germany (SOEP) 0.67 1.02 4.06* 2.11 3.08* 1.82*
United Kingdom (BHPS) .. .. .. .. 5.09** 0.92
Panel B. Labour market group
Total 1.19* 1.11* 5.28* 0.91* 2.65* 1.22*
Gender
Men 1.65* 1.25* 5.51* 1.49* 3.12* 1.43*
Women 0.70 0.93* 4.97* 0.34 2.17* 0.97*
Age
25–34 2.13* 1.55* 6.21* 1.41* 4.40* 1.65*
35–44 0.55 0.92* 2.70** 0.78*** 0.83*** 1.06*
45–54 0.56 0.71* 1.47 0.17 0.81 0.72*
Educational attainment
Less than upper secondary 1.09 1.29* 2.58 0.64 1.39*** 1.24*
Upper secondary 0.11 0.93* 6.87* 0.35 2.44* 0.96*
More than upper secondary 1.43* 0.95* 3.03* 0.95* 1.97* 1.10*
*, **, *** Statistically signiﬁcant at 1% level, 5% level and 10% level, respectively.
.. Not enough observations with at least one job change after a training spell.
(1) Estimates of the wage premium of participating in training in one additional year, obtained from the estimation of a wage equation controlling for individual ﬁxed
effects, age, age squared, tenure, tenure squared, ﬁrm size, public sector dummy, occupation, permanent contract dummy, log of hours worked, log of hours worked
squared, the number of previous jobs, reason of last job change and interaction terms between country dummies, year dummies and date of interview. Training taken
with the current employer has been demeaned by subtracting job-match-speciﬁc means. Wage premia to training and formal education are estimated through a spe-
ciﬁcation that simultaneously includes both variables.
Source: Own calculations based on the European Community household panel, waves 1 to 7 (1994–2000).Qualit y and e f f icie ncy  in educat ion
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The probability of experiencing an involuntary separa-
tion is a natural objective measure for the risk of job loss.
A quick look at the data shows that workers who previ-
ously received education or training tend to separate less
often from their employer against their will (Chart 3).
However, the figures presented here must be handled
with special caution. Indeed, the fact that lay-offs seem
to be less frequent in the presence of training does not
prove that training reduces the probability of being laid
off. Providing an employee with training might be the
consequence (and not the cause) of the employer’s deci-
sion of not laying him/her off, which in turn might be
dependent on individual characteristics (including unob-
served ability). The natural framework to deepen this
analysis and address this issue would be a standard haz-
ard  model  with  controls  for  individual  fixed  effects.
Unfortunately,  there  is  no  cross-country  comparable
dataset  with  sufficiently  long  individual  time  series
where two complete job spells can be observed for a
large portion of the sample. For this reason, a formal
multivariate analysis of separation rates cannot be devel-
oped further in this paper. The route we follow here is
rather to look at the impact of training on the subjective
perception of employment security.
There is an increasing interest in the economic and socio-
logical literature for subjective measures of job security
(see OECD, 1997; Schmidt, 1999; Green et al., 2000;
Burchell et al., 2001; Green, 2003). Subjective measures
offer a synthesis of different aspects of employment secu-
rity but they have the disadvantage of muddling up the
expected cost of job loss (or threat of it) with subjective
judgements on what level of job security would be desir-
able, which might be influenced by social norms as well
as by attitudes towards risk, that may evolve during the
lifecycle. These norms and attitudes might have little to do
with objective security but — even worse — might affect
the propensity to participate in training courses. Further-
more,  subjective  perceptions  might  be  influenced  by
information disclosures that are only imperfectly corre-
lated with real changes in objective risks. However, there
seems to be a relatively good correspondence between
Chart 3:  Differences in involuntary separation rates between trained and 
untrained employees by labour market group and type of training
(1) Percentage-point difference in annualised rates of involuntary separations between trained and untrained employees. Involuntary separation rates are
deﬁned as the share of employees at date t who have lost their job against their will by date t+1. Trained employees are deﬁned as those who received
some training between date t-1 and t. Data refer to persons aged 25–54 years.
Source: Own calculations based on the European Community household panel, waves 1 to 7 (1994–2000).
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subjective and objective measures of job insecurity, both
at the individual and at the aggregate level (OECD, 1997,
2002, 2004; Wanner and Neumark, 1999; Farber, 2003).
Subjective perceptions might also have an independent
impact on workers’ well-being: for instance, Burchell et
al. (2001) report a strong link between perception of job
insecurity and stress, and find that such a relationship
becomes stronger as employees’ exposure to insecurity
increases. Last but not least, subjective feelings might
affect the political economy of structural reforms.
Chart 4 focuses on the two-year variation of perceptions
of job security (measured on a 1–6 Likert scale) and com-
pares the share of employees for which their perception of
job security has increased, decreased, or stayed the same,
by country and training status. In all countries for which
data are available except the United Kingdom, the per-
centage of workers who report a negative change in per-
ceived job security is smaller in the case of those who
received some education or training in the meantime than
in the case of those who received none (with a 3 percent-
age point gap on average). Conversely, there is a less clear
relationship between training and positive changes in job
security. On average, about 32 % of workers report to
have experienced an increase in job security, independ-
ently from whether they have also received training.
The figures presented in the previous chart are, however,
particularly  difficult  to  interpret.  Besides  the  general
problems directly related to the use of subjective meas-
ures, a (temporary) improvement in the job match may
simultaneously increase the amount of training individu-
als receive and their perception of job security. As done
before, it is partially possible to sort these problems out
by  distinguishing  between  training  with  the  previous
employers and training with the current employers. In
this case, however, the effect of training with the current
employer cannot be identified by controlling for match-
specific  effects.  In  fact,  the  quality  of  the  job-match
might not be acknowledged by workers at the moment of
hiring and training provision by the employers might be
one of the channels through which information is dis-
closed: receiving employer-sponsored training, employ-
ees realise that their employer does not intend to lay
Chart 4:  Changes in job security and formal education or training, by country
NT: Employees who received no training in the reference period.
T: Employees who received some training in the reference period.
(1) Two-year changes in the individual perception of job security.
(2) Data refer to employees working more than 15 hours per week and aged 25–54 years.
Source: Own calculations based on the European Community household panel, waves 1 to 7 (1994–2000).
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them off or, in the case of temporary workers, that their
contract  will  be  renewed  or  transformed,  thereby
improving  their  perception  of  job  security,  with  no
causal effect of training.
Following the literature on job satisfaction, one could
estimate a fixed effect linear model (Heywood et al.,
2002) or a fixed effect logit model (Winkelmann and
Winkelmann, 1998), by collapsing the measure of job
security into a dichotomous variable. However, neither
of these methods is ideal, since in the first case the qual-
itative (or at least double censored) nature of the data is
not taken into account, while in the second case a great
deal  of  information  is  thrown  away.  In  this  paper,  I
choose to follow the first route and estimate the model in
first differences, using observations at relatively distant
dates —  two  years.  The  advantage  of  estimating  the
model in first-difference is that I can perform a sensitiv-
ity analysis by checking that results are not due to heter-
ogeneity of returns at different levels of initial employ-
ment security. Accordingly, Table 2 reports estimates by
labour market groups, while Table 3 reports estimates by
lagged levels of employment security.
Table 2 
Panel data estimates of the impact of training on security, by labour market group
Percentage (1)(2)
Panel A. Formal education or training
Training taken with 
previous employers
Training taken with the 
current employer
Training taken with 
previous employers
Training taken with the 
current employer
Model 1 (3) Model 2 (4)
Total 1.7* 2.0* 1.5* 1.8*
Gender
Men 2.0* 2.0* 1.6* 1.8*
Women 1.0*** 2.0* 1.3** 1.9*
Age
25–34 1.1** 2.0* 0.9* 1.7*
35–44 2.0* 1.7* 1.8* 1.6*
45–54 1.8*** 2.2* 2.0** 1.9*
Educational attainment
Less than upper secondary 3.1** 2.7* 3.1** 2.5*
Upper secondary 1.0*** 1.7* 0.7 1.5*
More than upper secondary – 0.1 0.7* 0.0 0.6**
Panel B. Formal education (5)
Training taken with 
previous employers
Training taken with the 
current employer
Training taken with 
previous employers
Training taken with the 
current employer
Model 1 (3) Model 2 (4)
Total 0.1 0.7** 0.0 0.7**
Gender
Men 0.6 1.0** 0.2 1.1**
Women – 0.1 0.3 – 0.4 0.4
Age
25–34 0.6 0.0 – 0.2 – 0.1
35–44 – 0.7 1.2** – 0.7 1.2**
45–54 – 2.7 1.4*** – 2.3 1.7**
Educational attainment
Less than upper secondary 2.4 0.9 1.9 0.7
Upper secondary – 0.4 0.2 – 1.0 0.3
More than upper secondary – 0.8 – 0.1 – 0.6 0.0
(Continued on the next page)Par t   II I:  Adult   educat i on  and t r aini ng
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Two  clear  facts  seem  to  emerge  from  Table  2  and
Table 3. First, vocational training taken with previous
employers has a positive impact on the perception of job
security of all categories of workers (with the exception
of those with the highest educational attainment) and,
essentially, all levels of employment security (1). Given
that these measures are partially forward-looking (that
is, take into account the perceived risk of job loss), these
results yield some support to the conjecture that returns
to training might be positive even for those categories for
which they do not show up in the wage level (conditional
on being employed). Second, and more striking, training
taken with previous employers has the greatest impact
on perceived job security for those categories for which
estimated  wage  premia  are  smaller.  Conditional  on
changing job, for each year of previous training, employ-
ees without upper secondary qualification are estimated
to increase their perceived job security by about 3 %, and
employees aged from 35 to 54 years, by more than 2 %,
with  no  smaller  effect  when  only  vocational  training
(excluding education) is taken into account (2).
As conjectured above, the fact that training seems to
have a stronger impact on employment security than on
wages (conditional on being employed) in the case of
older prime-age workers can be easily explained through
the effect of skill obsolescence on individual wages and
productivity: in the presence of downward wage rigidity,
Table 2 (continued) 
Percentage (1)(2)
Panel C. Training (5)
Training taken with 
previous employers
Training taken with the 
current employer
Training taken with 
previous employers
Training taken with the 
current employer
Model 1 (3) Model 2 (4)
Total 1.6* 2.1* 1.6* 1.8*
Gender
Men 2.1* 2.0* 1.8* 1.7*
Women 0.8 2.1* 1.3** 1.9*
Age
25–34 0.7 2.2* 0.8 2.0*
35–44 2.4* 1.6* 2.1* 1.4*
45–54 2.5** 2.1* 2.6** 1.8*
Educational attainment
Less than upper secondary 3.0** 2.8* 3.1** 2.6*
Upper secondary 1.1*** 1.8* 1.0 1.5*
More than upper secondary 0.1 0.8* 0.1 0.6*
*, **, *** Statistically signiﬁcant at 1% level, 5% level and 10% level, respectively.
(1) Estimates of the percentage impact on the average employee’s perception of job security (measured on a 1–6 Likert scale) of participating in some training in one
additional year. The dependent variable is the two-year change in perceived job security. Estimates are obtained by OLS, adjusting standard errors for heteroskedas-
ticity of unkown form.
(2) Data refer to employees working more than 15 hours per week and aged 25–54 years.
(3) Controls are two-year differences of age and age squared, dummies for lagged level of job security, two year differences of the number of previous jobs, dummies for
voluntary or involuntary separation and country per year dummies.
(4) Controls are: two year differences of age, age squared, tenure, tenure squared, log wage, log of hours worked, dummies for public/private employment, the number
of previous jobs, lagged level of perceived job security, voluntary or involuntary separations in the two-year reference period and country per year dummies.
(5) Separate estimates for training and formal education are obtained by including both variables in the same speciﬁcation.
Source: Own calculations based on the European Community household panel, waves 1 to 7 (1994–2000).
¥1∂ Table 2 also reports estimates for the impact of formal education only,
which is insignificant. Beyond the usual caution due to the fact that few
education spells are observed in the sample, it must be taken into account
that the effect of education is likely to materialise only in the long run. In
the short run, individuals who have got a better diploma often start new
careers by accepting better paid temporary contracts.
¥2∂ Care must be taken in interpreting these results, however, because the esti-
mates are likely to be biased due to the inclusion of the lagged level of per-
ceived job security, which is endogenous. Nevertheless, a quick look at the
data shows that perceived job security exhibits a clear pattern of mean
reversal; therefore it is likely that omitting the lagged level of job security
would have induced an even greater bias. The application of instrumental
variable techniques is made complex here by the lack of obvious instru-
ments and is left for future research.Qualit y and e f f icie ncy  in educat ion
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Table 3
Estimates of the impact of training on security, by lagged level of job security
Percentage (1)(2)
Panel A. Formal education or training
Training taken with 
previous employers
Training taken with the 
current employer
Training taken with 
previous employers
Training taken with the 
current employer
Model 1 (3) Model 2 (4)
Lagged level of job security (3)
1 28.3* 15.2* 18.9** 6.8
2 3.9 1.4 0.8 0.4
3 7.0* 2.7* 6.2* 2.4*
4 2.9* 2.1* 2.5* 1.9*
5 1.3** 1.8* 1.3** 1.6*
6 1.6* 1.4* 1.8* 1.3*
Panel B. Formal education (5)
Training taken with 
previous employers
Training taken with the 
current employer
Training taken with 
previous employers
Training taken with the 
current employer
Model 1 (3) Model 2 (4)
Lagged level of job security (3)
1 – 5.4 – 12.6 – 15.8 – 21.1***
2 – 5.3 – 6.9 – 11.3*** – 5.5
3 1.1 – 0.5 – 1.2 – 1.3
4 3.9** 2.0** 3.0*** 1.9**
5 1.1 1.5* 1.1 1.7*
6 – 0.4 0.1 – 0.3 0.3
Panel C. Training(5)
Training taken with 
previous employers
Training taken with the 
current employer
Training taken with 
previous employers
Training taken with the 
current employer
Model 1 (3) Model 2 (4)
Lagged level of job security (3)
1 33.8* 20.0* 26.4* 13.3**
2 6.3 2.8 5.6 1.5
3 8.0* 3.3* 8.0* 3.1*
4 2.0** 1.8* 1.7 1.5*
5 1.0*** 1.6* 1.1*** 1.4*
6 1.7* 1.4* 1.9* 1.4*
*, **, *** Statistically signiﬁcant at 1% level, 5% level and 10% level, respectively.
(1) Estimates of the percentage impact on the average employee’s perception of job security (measured on a 1–6 Likert scale) of participating in some training in one
additional  year.  The  dependent  variable  is  the  two-year  change  in  perceived  job  security.  Estimates  are  obtained  by  OLS,  adjusting  standard  errors  for
heteroskedasticity of unknown form.
(2) Data refer to employees working more than 15 hours per week and aged 25–54 years.
(3) Controls are two-year differences of age and age squared, two year differences of the number of previous jobs, dummies for voluntary or involuntary separation and
country per year dummies.
(4) Controls are: two year differences of age, age squared, tenure, tenure squared, log wage, log of hours worked, public/private employment, the number of previous
jobs, voluntary or involuntary separations in the two-year reference period and country per year dummies.
(5) Separate estimates for training and formal education are obtained by including both variables in the same speciﬁcation.
Source: Own calculations based on the European Community household panel, waves 1 to 7 (1994–2000).Par t   II I:  Adult   educat i on  and t r aini ng
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skill obsolescence compresses the wedge between pro-
ductivity and wage, thereby increasing the risk of job
loss  without  affecting  the  wage  level  conditional  on
keeping the job. In this case training is required to main-
tain workers’ competences so that their productivity will
match their wage. If the wage structure is compressed, a
similar argument can be generalised to all low produc-
tive workers (including, potentially, those with little or
no qualifications). For instance, if the minimum wage is
relatively high, a greater chance of being employed con-
stitutes the main benefit from training for workers whose
productivity would otherwise not match the minimum
wage under all possible contingencies (Agell and Lom-
merud, 1997).118
3. Are training investments inefficiently low?
Overall, the previous section has shown that those work-
ers, who do not seem to benefit from training through
greater wages, can benefit from training by securing more
stable employment prospects through lower job loss risk
and/or greater chances to be re-employed quickly and in
less precarious jobs. This is particularly the case for those
categories  (such  as  low-educated  older  workers)  for
whom their productivity-wage gap is more likely to be
increasingly compressed — as they age — by companies’
personnel policies and/or institutional arrangements (such
as minimum wages). Once foregone income due to non-
employment spells is taken into account, training premia
for all groups are likely to be large.
If private returns are high (1), why should governments
adopt a proactive approach vis-à-vis training policy? The
theory suggests that imperfections in labour, capital and
training markets might interact in such a way to push
economic agents (employers and employees) to invest in
training less than the social optimum.
First, if labour markets are not perfectly competitive,
firms may have an incentive to invest in general human
capital (valuable also at other firms) to the extent that the
market for skilled labour is less competitive than the
market for unskilled labour, so that the training firm can
afford to pay a trained worker less than its marginal
product while still retaining the worker (see Acemoglu
and Pischke, 1999a; Stevens, 1999). This is particularly
the case for skills that cannot be useful to many other
employers (Stevens 1994; 2001). Nevertheless, it might
occur also in the case of fully general training due to
asymmetric information and lack of certification (or lack
of  recognition  of  qualifications),  frictions  and  search
costs,  wage-bargaining  institutions  and  outcomes,
adverse selection affecting quits and lay-offs, or comple-
mentarity with specific investments (see Acemoglu and
Pischke,  1999b).  Symmetrically,  these  labour  market
imperfections reduce workers’ incentive to invest in gen-
eral training, insofar as they decrease workers’ appropri-
ability of its benefits. Since, in most conceivable situa-
tions, current employers cannot internalise the benefits
from training that will accrue to future employers, by
increasing the share of general training costs borne and
benefits reaped by the firm, labour market imperfections
are  likely  to  generate  non-optimal  outcomes (2).  By
contrast, if pay scales reflected marginal productivity, as
would  be  the  case  with  perfect  competition,  workers
would be able to internalise lifetime benefits from gen-
eral training (Becker, 1975).
Second,  workers  may  lack  information  on  teaching
quality and be unable to distinguish between different
providers of educational services. Similarly, they might
not be aware of what curricula are likely to yield the
greatest  return  in  the  labour  market.  Furthermore,
today’s  economic  conditions  may  not  reflect  future
demand  for  educated  workers  and  the  abilities  to
acquire and exploit skills may not be known to the pro-
spective trainee before embarking in a course. These
problems may seem less severe when firms act as train-
ing  providers  or  intermediaries.  In  fact,  employers
might be more aware than workers of the required skills
and  curricula  (although  identification  of  training
¥1∂ In this paper we have confined our attention to workers’ benefits. Never-
theless, many empirical studies show that adult training has a positive
impact on productivity at the firm level and that part of these gains are
appropriated by the firm (See Barron et al., 1999a; Dearden et al., 2000;
and Ballot et al., 2001, for recent evidence for the USA, the United King-
dom as well as France and Sweden, respectively; see also Bartel, 2000, for
a  survey  of  previous  studies).  Total  private  returns  are  therefore  even
greater than the figures reported here.
¥2∂ There are some caveats to this statement that need to be spelled out. To be
true, this statement requires that quitting fees cannot be imposed on work-
ers separating voluntarily after training (see Moen and Rosen, 2002) and
that quit rates are not reduced by training. While the evidence seems to
point to a positive relationship between training and the probability of
quitting, at least in Europe (Brunello and De Paola, 2004), quitting fees are
sometimes established in employment contracts, although their use is per-
haps not widespread. Indeed, creating the institutional arrangements for
pay-back clauses in employment contracts is one of the most effective pol-
icy actions that government can do in support of training investments (see
Section 4.2).Par t   II I:  Adult   educat i on  and t r aini ng
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requirements might be a problem for some firms, par-
ticularly  SMEs).  There  is  nonetheless  a  conflict  of
interest between employers and employees insofar as
the former prefer providing specific training while the
latter prefer receiving general skills that can be re-sold
in the labour market (Stevens, 1994; Barron, Berger
and Black, 1999b). This conflict becomes particularly
acute  if  training  is  not  fully  contractible.  While  the
amount of training can be written down in a contract, its
type and quality are less likely to be specified in a man-
ner that is verifiable by third parties (e.g. courts of law,
Malcolmson,  1997,  1999;  Gibbons  and  Waldman,
1999).  This  may  induce  both  the  employee  and  the
employer  to  behave  non-cooperatively  and  invest  in
training separately without bargaining. In other words,
the employee may refuse to treat the employer as a pos-
sible (and actually privileged) provider and the training
provided by the employer will be entirely employer-
paid. It can be shown (Acemoglu and Pischke, 1999a)
that,  under  this  condition,  if  the  investments  of  the
employer and the employee are perfect substitutes and
returns to training are common knowledge, only one
party will invest in general training (the one that bene-
fits the most from that), and the amount of investment
will depend on the marginal return to that party, being
therefore not only sub-optimal but also lower than in
the  cooperative  case  wherein  training  contracts  are
enforceable.  The  intuition  is  that  once  the  optimal
investment of one party has been decided assuming no-
investment from the other party, the latter has no incen-
tive to top-up the former’s investment, despite the fact
that both parties would gain from sharing the cost of
investment and invest more. The investing party might
be the employer if there are labour market imperfec-
tions compressing the structure of wages over the skill
dimension. If this party is the employer, the greater the
monopsony power it has on its skilled workers (the
wider the labour market imperfections) the greater the
amount of general training provided. From a qualitative
point of view, this argument can be extended to all
cases of imperfect substitution, except when both par-
ties’ investments are fully complementary, but it is dif-
ficult to think about cases where this occurs in practice.
Third,  human  capital  cannot  be  used  as  collateral
(Becker,  1975).  Moreover,  individual  human  capital
investment  is  often  indivisible  and  therefore  the  risk
associated to it cannot be diversified. Finally, although
in a perfect information world, trainees could buy insur-
ance to shelter against the risk, in practice, a private
insurance market is unlikely to work in a proper way due
to the unobservability of the trainee’s effort and the size
of human capital investments (the level of individual lia-
bility required to avoid adverse selection would be too
high, see Stevens, 1999). The employer can partially
relax the employee’s credit constraint to the extent that
the employee accepts a lower wage during the training
period. However, there is a limit to the extent to which
small knowledge-intensive firms can borrow to finance
training expenditures using physical capital as collateral.
Furthermore, if workers cannot borrow at a competitive
interest rate, the demand for training may remain below
the social optimum, since in order to smooth consump-
tion over time the employee cannot accept large wage
cuts (see Acemoglu and Pischke, 1999a). Moreover, the
wage can be lowered in exchange of training provision
only if the latter is contractible. Nevertheless, as said, if
employers  have  some  market  power  over  their  own
skilled labour, they may have an incentive to bear part or
all the cost of training without asking for a reduction in
wages. As in the case of non-contractibility of training,
if workers are severely credit-constrained, labour market
imperfections are likely to increase training provision
since they increase firms’ investment with only limited
effects on workers’ investment, which is already low,
thereby easing the negative impact of capital and train-
ing market imperfections.
The interaction between different market failures is a
powerful explanatory tool for the empirical evidence.
The theory points to the fact that if imperfections in the
training or capital markets are not too severe, the nega-
tive effect of labour market imperfections on workers’
willingness to invest will dominate, since workers can
better  internalise  lifetime  benefits  from  training  than
their employers (see Stevens, 1999, for a simple graphi-
cal  explanation).  Conversely,  if  we  found  that  the
smaller the degree of competition in the labour markets
the greater the amount of training, this could be inter-
preted as evidence that training and capital market fail-
ures affecting training outcomes are pervasive (1). This
is indeed what seems to emerge from the empirical liter-
ature, at least insofar as European countries are con-
cerned. For instance, Bassanini and Brunello (2003), in
their most cautious estimate, suggest that in the Euro-
pean Union an increase of 1 percentage point in the train-
ing premium would induce a 3–4 % fall in the share of
employees undertaking general training, resulting from a
reduction  of  2.5–3.5 %  in  employer-financed  training
¥1∂ Alternative explanations remain, however, available (see Agell and Lom-
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and an almost negligible increase in self-financed train-
ing. Moreover, Brunello and Gambarotto (2004) esti-
mate larger effects for the United Kingdom. They find
that a 10 % increase in the density of local economic
activity — which can be considered as a proxy of the
level  of  local  labour  market  competition —  entails  a
20 % fall in average training provision. Similar results
are found by Arulampalam et al. (2004b) who estimate
the impact of the introduction of a minimum wage on the
level of training provision in the United Kingdom, while
the US literature on minimum wages and training is less
conclusive (see Neumark and Wascher, 2001; and Ace-
moglu and Pischke, 2003).121
4. The quest for efficient training policies
Insofar as market failures are responsible for suboptimal
training  provision,  a  first-best  approach  would  be  to
overcome  them  through  structural  reforms.  However,
some of these failures are due to ‘natural’ imperfections
of certain markets (1) and effective reforms to overcome
them have not been proposed yet. Furthermore, other
imperfections are induced by institutions and policies
that do not concern primarily training outcomes (e.g.
those affecting the wedge between wages and productiv-
ity such as minimum wages; see Acemoglu and Pischke,
2003), whose reform cannot be undertaken without a
careful evaluation of other relevant trade-offs. A second-
best approach is to increase the economic incentives to
invest in education and training, through fiscal policy
and  institutional  arrangements  favouring  cost-sharing
among private parties. However, policy design is crucial,
since some of the possible sources of market failure (e.g.
lack of contractibility of training quality) can equally
lead to policy failures, with the risk of large deadweight
losses and heavy burdens for the public budget.
This section reviews the experience of OECD countries
with various second-best approaches to surmount finan-
cial and economic barriers to the provision of and parti-
cipation in adult education and training. However, great
care must be exerted when drawing general conclusions
from this type of exercise for three reasons. First, strictly
speaking, the case in favour of public intervention has
not been made in a conclusive way. Second, in most
cases,  public  policies  focus  on  formal  education  and
training. This entails a risk of inefficient substitution
between formal and informal training. This risk must be
taken  into  account  in  the  case  of  policies  affecting
employers’ incentives to provide formal training, to the
extent  that  informal  training  is  more  likely  to  be
employer-paid, since it imparts competencies that are
less easily signalled to the external labour market (mak-
ing informal training, de facto, firm-specific, see Ace-
moglu  and  Pischke,  1999b;  and  Barron,  Berger  and
Black, 1999b). Third, policies are discussed here in a
partial equilibrium framework — that is, without consid-
ering the effect of the distortions induced by fund-raising
schemes required to finance training policies. Fourth,
and perhaps more importantly, the analysis is essentially
based on deductive arguments derived from the empiri-
cal results of the previous sections. In fact, there are only
few empirical evaluations of existing schemes and, with
few exceptions, those available are limited to descriptive
statistics  and  do  not  build  up  counterfactuals  against
which a rigorous assessment could be made. For these
reasons, it is only possible to discuss the problem each
specific policy can try to address and, to a limited extent,
whether it has been implemented in a consistent way. It
is not possible to make a more general assessment of
whether each intervention has been excessive, insuffi-
cient or just right vis-à-vis the target.
Since the 1960s, policies were formulated to address,
first and foremost, perceived rigidities on the supply side
that  interfered  with  adult  education.  The  underlying
assumption was one of substantial economic and social
demand for adults to return to formal education. Thus,
the  objective  of  recurrent  education  was  to  improve
learning opportunities for individuals by enhancing the
capacity of the formal education sector to accommodate
those wishing to return to education. However, recurrent
education  never  emerged  as  an  enduring  widespread
practice, in part because its associated costs were never
adequately funded.
More recently, greater emphasis has been devoted to the
demand side. This new emphasis has entailed a shift in
the target of public policy from providers and systems
geared to provision of education and training with rela-
tively homogeneous content to the demand of individu-
als and employers for more heterogeneous learning out-
¥1∂ The  lower  level  of  competition  in  the  market  for  workers  who  have
acquired imperfectly transferable skills is the easiest example. In contrast
to purely general skills, imperfectly transferable skills are not valuable at
every firm. Therefore, although training in these skills increases potential
job opportunities for the worker, finding them may require a long and
costly search process.Qualit y and e f f icie ncy  in educat ion
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comes. In other words, in contrast to children in initial
education, learning objectives of individual adults are
ever-changing  and  very  heterogeneous  so  that  such
needs  can  best  be  met  through  a  more  differentiated
arrangement of providers and courses than the delivery
mode characterising initial and recurrent education. As a
consequence, policy strategies to increase human capital
accumulation of adults have shifted from direct subsidi-
sation of external (public or private) providers of train-
ing  services  to  co-financing  schemes  intended  to
increase incentives for employers and/or individuals to
invest in more specific education and training. The shift
towards this policy approach is based on three general
principles:
• in  most  societies,  because  of  budget  constraints,
public authorities alone cannot provide the neces-
sary financial resources for lifelong learning;
• as lifelong learning generates considerable private
returns, employers and employees should finance
most of its costs; and
• greater reliance on market forces could strengthen
the incentives both for learners to seek more effi-
cient learning options and for providers to achieve
higher levels of efficiency.
Co-financing mechanisms — i.e. schemes that channel
resources from at least two parties among employers,
employees and governments — can be designed so as to
increase  incentives  to  invest  in  human  capital  for
employers, for individuals or for both.
Since the primary reason for which employers might
invest in training less than the socially optimal amount is
that current employers might not be able to internalise
benefits from training that will accrue to future employ-
ers, tax arrangements or grant schemes for enterprises
can be used to tackle aggregate under-investment. By
modifying the marginal cost of training, these schemes
may raise employers’ supply towards the socially opti-
mal level. These schemes can also be complemented by
policies favouring cost-sharing between employers and
employees, such as regulatory provisions for pay-back
clauses and time accounts, to the extent that training
market imperfections are not too strong. In fact, cost-
sharing is unlikely to occur if the content and quality of
training are not contractible.
For  workers  who  have  less  frequent  opportunities  to
receive employer-sponsored training, it is likely to be
difficult to target policies focusing on employers’ incen-
tives in an efficient way (see OECD, 2003a). Individual-
based demand-side policies (such as loan and subsidy
schemes), by relaxing individual borrowing constraints
and increasing expected rates of return, can thus play a
role.  However,  they  require  information  that  workers
often do not have. In addition, portability of skills must
be assured, particularly in the case of training not deliv-
ering  formal  diplomas.  As  a  consequence,  financial
incentives must be accompanied by adequate framework
conditions. Even in this case it might be difficult to target
with precision certain workers (such as workers with
poor  literacy  skills).  Strengthening  delivery  of  initial
education emerges therefore as a necessary complemen-
tary policy instrument.
The remainder of this section provides a survey of inno-
vative  co-financing  strategies  put  in  place  by  OECD
countries to overcome the economic and financial barri-
ers to invest in adult learning as well as framework con-
ditions necessary to make these strategies effective.
4.1. Incentives for firms
Tax arrangements for enterprises
Tax-based schemes have the advantage of building on
existing institutional arrangements for taxation, allowing
them to be generally and immediately applied with lim-
ited implementation costs; for the same reason they have
the disadvantage of being difficult to target precisely.
When these schemes are targeted, they may induce inef-
ficient substitution across groups (see below). As a con-
sequence, tax-based schemes typically leave total free-
dom to choose training content and participants to firms.
‘Train or pay schemes’, which establish training levies to
be paid by employers who do not train, are a route to
tackling free-riding and under-provision that was popu-
lar in the 1970s. France first adopted this approach with
the loi de 16 juillet 1971, which introduced a minimum
training expenditure and required that each firm pays, as
a levy, an amount equal to the difference between this
legal minimum and its actual training expenditure. The
law  initially  required  employers  to  invest  an  amount
equal to 0.8 % of total payroll. That requirement has
risen  gradually  to  1.6 %  in  recent  years,  being  even
higher for temporary work agencies and workers with
fixed-term  contracts.  A  number  of  other  countriesPar t   II I:  Adult   educat i on  and t r aini ng
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including  Australia,  the  Quebec  province  of  Canada,
Korea and the United Kingdom adopted similar provi-
sions  in  subsequent  years,  but  abandoned  them  later.
Today, only Quebec is still following the French model,
while a number of other countries have introduced levy/
grant systems where all employers pay the levy inde-
pendently  of  their  training  expenditure  and  can  then
recover part or all of it by applying for grants from spe-
cific funds financed through the levy (see below).
Train-or-pay schemes confront employers with a finan-
cially neutral choice between training (and not paying
the tax), or not training (and paying the tax). Funds col-
lected this way are then distributed to firms in the form
of additional grants. Strictly speaking, firms receive no
automatic  subsidy,  since  grants  are  not  necessarily
awarded. ‘Train-or-pay’ levies, however, are equivalent
to schemes where there is a tax of a given percentage of
payroll independent of training expenditures, a 100 %
automatic subsidy of training expenditures up to that
percentage of payroll, and an additional grant awarded
through case-by-case analysis of training projects.
The problem with these schemes is that what counts for
individual or employer’s decisions to invest in training is
the difference between marginal expected benefits and
marginal training costs. Train-or-pay schemes focus on
total  cost,  thereby  inducing  large  deadweight  losses.
This is immediately evident in the case of firms that
would  have  spent  up  to  the  legal  minimum  anyway,
since these firms enjoy a windfall without increasing
their incentives to invest in training. However, by cover-
ing total costs up to a pre-determined ceiling, ‘train or
pay’ levy/grant schemes also ‘overpay’ the increase in
training investment they induce on the part of firms that
would have spent less than the legal minimum in the
absence of the scheme.
In other countries — including Austria (in 2000), Italy
(in 2001), Luxembourg (in 1999) and the Netherlands (in
1998) — fiscal deductions represent a matched contribu-
tion from the government that never covers the totality of
training costs. In these countries employers are allowed
to deduct more than 100 % of the cost of training from
turnover when determining taxable income (Table 4).
The extra-deduction (that is the actual subsidy) amounts
to 10 % of training expenditures in Luxembourg, 20 %
in Austria and the Netherlands and up to 50 % in Italy.
The main differences across countries concern the type
of expenditures that are eligible for deduction. In fact,
although internal training expenditures are more difficult
to define in a clear and transparent way, covering only
external expenditures might lead to inefficient substitu-
tion of external for internal training, with little or no
impact on the overall volume. While in the Netherlands
and Luxembourg both external and internal training are
covered by these schemes, in Austria internal training
expenditures are eligible for deduction only if provided
by an in-company training institution (or separate legal
entity). The Italian case is more complex since before the
‘Tremonti-bis’ Act (Legge 383/2001), training expendi-
tures were not treated as costs of business. As a conse-
quence, the law has introduced a true extra-deduction
only for those expenditures that are normally counted as
operating costs (such as trainees’ and internal trainers’
wages) and has only partially caught-up with the legisla-
tion of most other countries for other types of training
expenditures. Another key issue is whether only direct
costs are eligible for the extra tax deduction or if trainees’
wages are also considered. For instance, in the Italian
scheme the latter are included in up to 20 % of the pay-
roll,  while  in  the  Dutch  scheme  they  are  generally
excluded. When trainees’ wages are excluded, it can be
expected that these types of incentives tend not to be
neutral  with  respect  to  trainees’  characteristics  and
favour those for whom employers’ opportunity cost of
training (in terms of wage plus foregone productivity) is
lower, such as inexperienced newly-hired workers. Nev-
ertheless, most of these schemes are very recent and there-
fore there are no rigorous evaluations of their impacts.
Tax deductions provide no incentive to increase training
if employers do not expect positive profits in a given fis-
cal year. This is particularly undesirable insofar as it is
precisely during slack periods that the economic cost of
foregoing  production  during  training  is  lowest.  To
address this issue, Austrian law provides that 6 % of all
training expenditures incurred in a given year, which
cannot be deducted in that year, can be either paid out to
the firm or subtracted from the firm’s tax liability in the
previous or subsequent year. Similarly, deductions of
training expenditures can be postponed for up to 4 and 10
years in Italy and Luxembourg, respectively, if taxable
income  is  negative.  A  Swedish  survey  reports  that
employers would expect to increase training expendi-
tures significantly if similar arrangements were intro-
duced in their country (Håkanson, Johanson and Mel-
lander, 2002).
Targeting certain types of firms whose training supply is
particularly low (such as small firms) through additionalQualit y and e f f icie ncy  in educat ion
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corporate tax deductions is feasible — at least in prin-
ciple. Conversely, targeting specific worker groups may
involve undesirable substitution effects. For example,
Leuven and Oosterbeek (2004) show that the 40 % extra-
deduction to train workers aged 40 years or older, intro-
duced in the Netherlands in 1998 and recently abolished,
induced significant substitution between training work-
ers above the age threshold and training workers imme-
diately below it. Once the substitution effect is taken
into account,  the  overall  effectiveness  of  the  scheme
becomes questionable.
Summarising,  it  can  be  tentatively  concluded  that  an
effective use of tax incentives to reduce the possible
firms’  under-investment  in  training  requires  extra-
deductions of training expenditures rather than ‘train or
pay’ schemes, which involve a large deadweight cost. It
is also desirable that these deductions can be postponed
for several years if companies have no positive profits in
the year they make the expenditure.
Grant schemes and special funds for enterprises
In ‘train-or-pay’ schemes, the levy is payable only if the
firm’s own training effort falls short of a legal minimum.
By  contrast,  other  levy/grant  schemes  imply  that  all
companies pay a training levy — normally as a percent-
age of payroll — after which they can try to recover (part
of) their payment through applications for grants to fund
training. Grants do not tend to reflect company payments
and therefore allow redistribution of funds towards pre-
defined priorities.
Prime  examples  of  this  kind  of  levy/grant  schemes  at
national level are found in Spain and Belgium. In Spain,
employers  pay  0.7 %  of  payroll  into  a  training  fund
administered by a Tripartite Training Foundation, where
sectoral commissions staffed by employer and trade union
representatives decide and manage training grants. In Bel-
gium, a nationwide collective agreement, which was later
converted into a law, requires employers to pay 0.25 % of
payroll into a training fund, a sum that can be topped up
by branch-level collective agreements.
In addition to systems established by nationwide legisla-
tion, a number of countries have sectoral training levies
established through branch-level collective agreements.
For example, the Netherlands and Denmark have fol-
lowed this route, with half of the Dutch and one third of
the Danish workforce currently covered by sectoral lev-
ies  and  training  funds  (Gasskov,  2001).  The  average
contribution rate in the Netherlands is 0.5 %, but with
considerable variation across branches. Other countries,
such as France and Belgium, have set up many sectoral
funds on top of their national levy regulation. Similarly,
Table 4
Corporate tax deductions for training expenditures in selected OECD countries
Country Main provisions Restrictions
Austria Deduction of 120 % of CVT cost from turnover. Alternatively, 
deduction of 6 % from previous or subsequent year’s tax 
liability (since 2002).
For externally provided CVT that is relevant to company 
interests (since 2000); for internal CVT organised by a 
separate in-company training unit (since 2003).
Italy Deduction of 150 % of CVT cost from turnover (since 2001). If 
no taxable income in a given year, deduction can be 
postponed for up to four years.
150 % deduction only for expenditures normally counted as 
operating costs (such as trainees’ and trainers’ wages). 
Deduction may include up to 20 % of payroll.
Luxembourg Deduction of up to 110 % of CVT cost from turnover (since 
1999). If no taxable income in a given year, deduction can be 
postponed for up to 10 years.
Netherlands Deduction of 120 % of CVT cost from turnover (since 1998). 
More generous schemes for small ﬁrms and low-educated 
workers.
Only for training that is relevant to current functions of 
trainee. In the case of internal training, only cost of time 
spent by trainer can be deducted, with the exception of 
training for previously unemployed workers (aged 23 years 
or older) that are trained to basic qualiﬁcation level, for 
which employers can deduct also workers’ wages and 
indirect training costs such as those due to extra supervision 
and modiﬁcation of production plans (since 2002).
CVT: Continuous vocational training.
Source: OECD Secretariat on the basis of information supplied by the countries in question.Par t   II I:  Adult   educat i on  and t r aini ng
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the USA has compulsory schemes for making contribu-
tions to training funds in a few sectors or companies with
high trade union density, such as the automotive indus-
try. Typically, there is a bipartite or tripartite joint gov-
ernance  of  the  training  funds  financed  through  levy
schemes (see Ok and Tergeist, 2003, for detailed exam-
ples),  but  there  are  some  exceptions  (notably  Korea,
where the public employment service administers the
respective fund).
Apart from programmes financed through specific lev-
ies, most OECD countries (e.g. European Union coun-
tries, the Czech Republic, Korea, Japan, Mexico, Poland
and the USA) have some programmes for subsidising
company training expenditures that are financed out of
the central government budget. However, grant schemes,
whether financed through a special levy or out of the nor-
mal budget, have the drawback of high administrative
costs. Also, there is a trade-off between allowing flexi-
bility to accommodate demand-driven needs and con-
straining  the  scheme  via  rigid  eligibility  criteria  to
ensure transparency and minimise abuse. Furthermore, it
has been argued that small firms may find it compara-
tively more costly to meet all the conditions required to
file grant applications (Gasskov, 1998).
4.2. Institutional arrangements 
to enable cost-sharing
Pay-back clauses
In principle, statutory or contractual pay-back clauses
can specify that a worker leaving the firm within a spec-
ified period after an education or training spell has to
agree  to  reimburse  at  least  part  of  the  training  costs
incurred by the employer. Pay-back clauses are intended
to mitigate two of the market failures potentially affect-
ing education and training. On the one hand, they limit
the extent to which future employers can appropriate the
benefits from current employers’ investments in training
through  the  poaching  of  trained  employees,  thereby
allowing current employers to recoup the cost of training
by setting wages below productivity after the training
spell. On the other hand, they permit workers to share the
costs of training even in the presence of serious individ-
ual credit constraints, by de facto borrowing from their
employers with low default risk.
In Luxembourg, if no collective agreement specifies dif-
ferently, the loi cadre 22 juin 1999 establishes a pay-
back clause covering part of the expenses paid by the
employer  in  the  3  years  preceding  a  voluntary  quit,
except when the latter is due to the employer’s miscon-
duct. Similar provisions apply also in the case of lay-offs
for serious fault by the employee. In many countries (e.g.
Austria, the Czech Republic, Germany, Korea, Italy, the
Netherlands, Norway, Switzerland, and the USA), pay-
back clauses are not established by the law but are per-
mitted within certain limits in individual contracts or
collective agreements.
Even where pay-back clauses are legal, their application
might be limited due to problems of contractibility of
training contents that discourage an effective sharing of
training  costs  (see  the  previous  section).  Pay-back
clauses may be well suited for formal education or exter-
nal training programmes, leading to certification, since
training-related expenditures, training content and qual-
ity as well as the value of being trained for the employee
(i.e. the market price for the skills acquired through edu-
cation or training) can be easily assessed. However, this
is not the case for many other types of training. For
instance, in Italy pay-back clauses have been used partic-
ularly for newly hired managers enrolling in MBA pro-
grammes.  Similarly,  statutory  provisions  in  Luxem-
bourg apply only to training leading to certification and
in the context of an agreed firm training plan, while in
Germany  courts  have  found  contractual  pay-back
clauses  admissible  only  if  the  quitting  employee  can
benefit from the content of training in other jobs. None-
theless,  Bellmann  and  Düll  (2001)  report  that  about
15 %  of  German  enterprises  apply  pay-back  clauses.
Pay-back clauses might also be more viable if stipulated
through collective agreements, since trade unions are in
a better position to monitor training contents than indi-
vidual workers. In the Netherlands, for example, many
collective  agreements  establish  pay-back  clauses
(Waterreus, 2002).
Apprenticeships
Apprenticeships are another type of contract that allows
sharing the cost of training in a similar way to pay-back
clauses. In many countries, apprenticeships represent a
longstanding system of combining training and employ-
ment so that people entering an occupation can receive
instruction in the specific skills needed while working in
that particular occupation. Common features of apprentice
contracts are that they last for a duration specified at the
start, apprentices are paid less than their productivity dur-
ing most of the period covered by the contract, and a rec-
ognised  qualification  is  delivered  at  the  end,  with  the
apprentice receiving a substantial wage increase if he/sheQualit y and e f f icie ncy  in educat ion
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stays with the same firm. These features make apprentice
contracts a valid option even for non-contractible training
(Malcomson, Maw and McCormick, 2003). Similarly to
contracts  involving  pay-back  clauses,  employers  can
recoup the cost of training by paying workers less than
their marginal product in the final stage of the apprentice-
ship. But contrary to pay-back clauses workers can quit
before the end of the contract without penalty except that,
if they do, they do not receive the final certification. For
this reason, workers have an interest to stay at least until
the end of the apprenticeship, but firms have an interest to
provide good-quality training to minimise quits. To the
extent that there are no age limits, apprentice contracts can
be successful also within groups of low-qualified mature
workers. For instance, in Australia, since all age restric-
tions were removed from apprenticeships and traineeships
in  1992,  individuals  aged  25  years  and  over  have
accounted for the majority of new apprenticeships, but
this strong growth has not come at the expense of younger
apprentices whose number also rose (OECD, 2003c).
Working-time and training-time accounts
In many OECD countries, increased flexibility of work-
ing-time arrangements, featuring inter alia the annuali-
sation of working hours or long hours-averaging periods,
has led to the creation of working-time accounts for indi-
vidual employees. The basic idea behind working-time
accounts  is  that  over  a  certain  period  of  time  an
employee is able to work longer or shorter hours than the
standard working time established by the employment
contract, and thereby accumulate working-time credits
or debits in an individual account, which are later com-
pensated for by additional free time or work. As a result,
they can be used to share training costs in a similar way
to  pay-back  clauses,  except  that  with  working-time
accounts workers de facto anticipate their share of the
cost. Additionally, they may facilitate overcoming those
constraints posed by time constraints, which are one of
the most important factors preventing workers from tak-
ing the desired amount of training (see OECD, 2003a).
Already in 1994, France adopted a law introducing a
‘time-saving account’ for employees (compte épargne-
temps).  This  account  allowed  workers  to  accumulate
time credits over a number of years — using, for example,
overtime hours or reduced working hours in the frame-
work of the move towards the 35-hour week — and sub-
sequently decide whether to make use of this ‘time cap-
ital’ for, inter alia, early or gradual retirement, the take-
up of part-time work, or training leave. So far, the use of
the account for training has occurred only in a small
minority of cases. However, legislation passed in 2003
urges social partners to negotiate about the use of work-
ing-time accounts for training purposes.
In the Netherlands, about one quarter of large collective
agreements establish the possibility of saving spare time
for  educational  purposes.  Compensating  accumulated
overtime hours in the form of extended leave at a later
date  is  a  very  common  practice  in  Denmark  (EIRO,
2001). In a recent employer survey in western Germany
(excluding  Berlin),  11 %  of  all  companies  that  offer
training — primarily the larger ones — and that operate
working-time  accounts  offer  the  option  of  using  the
accumulated working-time capital for training purposes
(Dobischat  and  Seifert,  2001).  Such  ‘training  time
accounts’  can  be  fed  through  accumulated  overtime
hours or through special employer bonuses. As in the
case of other instruments that facilitate a sharing of train-
ing  costs  between  employers  and  employees,  time
accounts are likely to be effective only to the extent that
training is contractible. As such, their use is likely to be
limited when training opportunities must be chosen by
the employee within the training plan of the company,
except when the latter has resulted from an effective
negotiation among social partners (see below).
4.3. Incentives to increase 
individual demand
Most  individual-based  demand-side  schemes  try  to
address simultaneously individual borrowing constraints
and low or uncertain rates of returns for specific groups
who  typically  do  not  receive  employer-sponsored
training (1).  The  main  rationale  for  individual-based
demand-side schemes is that they can be more precisely
targeted  than  financial  incentives  for  employers  (or
training institutions), while providing the individual with
a greater range of training choices.
Subsidies
Most countries have schemes to subsidise directly indi-
viduals  enrolling  in  training  courses.  Subsidies  are
flexible  instruments  that  can  target  specific  groups.
However, they often require careful attention to frame-
work conditions in order to work properly (see below).
¥1∂ The only exception is loan schemes. However, the UK experience suggests
that loan schemes may have only limited appeal because adults tend to be
more reluctant than younger persons to finance learning through loans,
perhaps due to existing debts (e.g.home mortgages), family responsibili-
ties, or shorter payback periods (Callender, 2002).Par t   II I:  Adult   educat i on  and t r aini ng
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Three issues are key in the economic analysis of subsi-
dies to individuals: (i) what the subsidy covers: fees
and/or  living  expenses  and/or  foregone  income;  (ii)
what requirements individuals must satisfy to qualify
for the subsidy; and (iii) to what extent individuals are
free to choose the type and timing of training as well as
the training provider.
There is an evident tension between, on the one hand,
increasing training demand and individual choice with-
out boosting costs and, on the other hand, conveying
adequate information about training quality to individ-
uals and preventing possible abuses. In principle, the
former objective would require allowing the supply of
training services to respond freely to demand through
free entry and course innovations. However, a certain
amount of time-consuming screening, monitoring and
control is called for by the second objective. In prac-
tice, subsidy schemes that give total freedom of choice
to individuals are rare (perhaps only the UK individual
learning accounts fall into these categories, but their
evaluation suggests that excessive freedom made the
system liable to fraud and abuses; Owens, 2001; York
Consulting, 2002). In most cases governments compro-
mise between these conflicting objectives by constrain-
ing training choices within a more or less wide menu
and  adjusting  the  subsidy  rate  accordingly.  For
instance, training vouchers (used, for example, in cer-
tain regions of Italy and Switzerland) typically leave
free  individual  choice  within  courses  offered  by
accredited training providers.
In some cases, subsidies target explicitly specific seg-
ments of the population. For instance, in Germany, the
government subsidises training expenditures of workers
aged over 50 and workers with no vocational qualifica-
tion  (or  those  with  vocational  qualifications  but  who
have been in semi-skilled or unskilled occupations for
more than four years). Nevertheless, except within cer-
tain leave schemes (see below), direct training subsidies
seem to be unable to radically increase training, to the
extent that training outcomes are not inefficiently low
because of relatively mild capital market failures. Only
in a few cases, in fact, are training subsidies intended to
replace  income  for  individuals  who  pursue  full-time
learning activities. Since government contribution is rel-
atively small, most of the burden remains on the individ-
ual, who usually has either no adequate incentives (e.g.
in the case of labour market imperfections) or no ade-
quate means (e.g. in the case of capital market imperfec-
tions) to bear it. In this respect, the evolution of the indi-
vidual  learning  account  established  by  Skandia —  a
Swedish private insurance company — offers insights
into the extent to which the impact of a subsidy scheme
on disadvantaged groups depends on the scale of contri-
butions from third parties. Within this scheme workers
can save up to 10 % of their salary in a saving account,
with  the  company  offering  a  one-to-one  match.  The
company has gradually increased its contribution up to a
three-to-one match for poorly qualified and lower paid
employees, raising dramatically the participation of this
group  that  was  severely  under-represented  when  the
scheme was first introduced (see OECD, 2003c).
Tax incentives
While expenditures for formal education usually can be
deducted from personal income taxes, tax systems are typ-
ically  more  restrictive  in  their  treatment  of  training
expenditure by individuals. Generally, such expenditure
cannot be deducted from the taxable income of individu-
als, except under circumstances in which such training is
required for the job they currently hold. Moreover, when
employers provide financial support for training that leads
to  recognised  qualifications,  the  expenditure  by  the
employer may be treated as taxable income to the learners.
Some initiatives have been taken to relax these restric-
tions. For instance, starting in 2003, Austrian legislation
will allow individuals to deduct costs related, not only to
training required for their current job, but also for train-
ing that equips them to change jobs or enter a new pro-
fession. In spite of the interest for these policy innova-
tions, it must be noted that tax deductions of current
individual expenses for education and training are likely
to be effective only for short and/or part-time training as
well as for high-wage employees, since individuals can
only make use of these deductions if they earn enough in
a fiscal year to be liable to pay taxes. There is no such
limitation  only  when  tax  deductions  apply  to  saving
schemes to finance future learning activities (e.g. indi-
vidual learning accounts and leave-saving schemes).
Training leaves
Meeting the training needs of employed individuals may
frequently require them to stop working for a consider-
able period of time. In many OECD countries access to
training under these circumstances is facilitated by stat-
utory or contractual training leave schemes that guaran-
tee employees the right to return to their jobs after com-
pleting the training course.Qualit y and e f f icie ncy  in educat ion
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Simulation  exercises  suggest  that  foregone  income
depresses  individual  rates  of  return  to  full-time  adult
education more than any other factor (OECD, 2003b).
This implies that subsidy schemes need to compensate in
part  for  foregone  income  to  reach  low-income/low-
wealth labour force segments, in particular when train-
ing requires a prolonged period of service (and wage)
reduction. For this reason, in some countries, special
training leave subsidies (Table 5) are available, particu-
larly to cover living expenses or partially replace fore-
gone income. In Germany, a special subsidy also exists
for  part-time  workers  participating  in  training.  Other
policy  alternatives  include  tax  incentives  for  saving
accounts, but they have been rarely established in prac-
tice by governments. One exception is the possibility for
Dutch employees, introduced in 2001, to join a ‘leave-
saving scheme’, which allows them to set aside up to
10 % of their gross yearly wage in a saving account with
privileged tax treatment to finance a personal leave, with
training or studies being one of the declared aims of such
leave.  Provisions  for  training  leaves  are  also  often
included  in  collective  agreements,  even  in  countries
where statutory schemes do not exist (such as Australia
and Portugal).
Table 5 








beneficiaries (% of 
total employment)
Comments
Austria Workers with a 
work history of over 
three years and with 
the current 
employer for the 
past two years
Individual workers A daily allowance of 
EUR 14.53 for a 




2 263 in 2002 
(0.1 %)
Belgium Full-time workers Employers Full wage costs (up 
to 80–120 hours for 
general education, 
120–180 hours for 
vocational training, 
and 180 hours for 
workers who take 
both general and 
vocational courses 
during the same 




60 270 during 
2000/01 academic 
year (1.5 %) 
Finland Employees with a 
work history of over 
10 years
Individual workers EUR 440 per month 
plus an earning-
related amount 
covering 15–20 % of 
the last monthly 
wage up to 1 year
Education and 
training insurance
5 236 in 2002 
(0.2 %) (2)
France Workers with a 
work history of over 
24 months and who 
worked with the 
current employer 
during the last 12 
months
Individual workers 80–90 % of the 
foregone wage up 
to one year or 1 200 
hours
Employers’
contribution (0.2 % 





26 169 in 2001 
(0.1 %)
Japan Employed persons 
who are covered by 
the employment 
insurance
Employers One quarter of the 
wage costs and one 
quarter of the direct 




3 265 in ﬁscal year 
2002 (0.01 %)
A budget of JPY 0.7 
billion was made 
available for ﬁscal 
year 2002
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In most countries that have training leave schemes, how-
ever, only a very limited number of employees have par-
ticipated in them. Belgium and Sweden, where almost
1 % of workers have been on leave each year since the
establishment of the schemes, are two exceptions to this
pattern. However, training leaves tend to be more popu-
lar among women than men, since they are seen as a flex-
ible way to reconcile further training needs with family
responsibilities.  For  instance,  in  Denmark  there  were
about 2 000 men and 6 000 women on training leave in
the second quarter of the year 2000 (representing about
0.1 % and 0.5 % of employment, respectively; EIRO,
2001). In Sweden, women take up training leave twice as
frequently as men. In Austria, training sabbaticals were
disproportionately used by women until the scheme was
reformed and going on training leave soon after mater-
nity leave forbidden. Belgium, where only one quarter of
the employees on training leave were women in the mid-
1990s, is an exception to this pattern, probably due to the
fact that part-time workers are excluded by the Belgian
scheme (Cedefop, 2001).
4.4. Framework conditions
The effectiveness of co-financing policies that aim to
increase  demand  by  employers  and  employees








beneficiaries (% of 
total employment)
Comments
Korea n.a. Employers One third of the 




7 756 in 2000 
(0.04 %)
Total subsidy of 
KRW 5 589 million 
in 2000
Norway Workers with a 
work history of over 
three years and with 
the current 
employer for the 
past two years
Individual workers NOK 80 000 per 
year, of which 60 % 
is a loan, 25 % is an 
unconditional grant 
and 15 % is 
converted from loan 
to grant when the 




n.a. Only for formal 
education
Spain Workers who have 
been employed by 
the same ﬁrm for at 
least one year
Individual workers Full foregone wages 




contribution to the 
Tripartite 
Foundation
1 394 in 2002 
(0.01 %) (3)
Sweden Workers who have 
been employed for 
at least six 
consecutive months 
or with a work 
history of over 12 
months during the 
last two years
Individual workers Grants and loans of 




for the workers 
aged 25 or older if 
the income of the 
beneﬁciary during 
the 12 months 
immediately
preceding the 
studies has been 
above a certain 
threshold
Study allowance by 
the government
0.7 % in 2002 Only for formal 
education
(1)  Countries without speciﬁc subsidy schemes or where the related schemes are governed by collective agreements, such as Australia, Germany, the Netherlands and
Portugal, are not included in the table.
(2)  The ﬁgure refers to the number of employees who have taken alternation leaves, of which only roughly 17 % indicate studying was the major reason.
(3)  The ﬁgure refers to the number of individual training permits approved by Forcem.
NB: n.a.: Information not available.
Source: OECD Secretariat on the basis of information supplied by the countries in question.Qualit y and e f f icie ncy  in educat ion
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(demand in the upstream market) hinges in part on cer-
tain framework conditions — the policy and institu-
tional  environment  in  which  they  are  implemented.
First, barriers to entry of bona fide training providers
must be relatively low to allow supply shifts accommo-
dating  demand  needs  without  raising  costs.  Second,
information on the nature, conditions (location, dura-
tion, timing), cost and quality of education and training
opportunities must be readily available to individuals
and employers in order to ensure efficient allocation of
resources for investment in education and training and
foster cost-sharing as well as cooperative behaviours.
Third, information on the nature and level of skills and
competencies that are acquired by individuals through
self-financed training must be transparently signalled
to external labour markets so that workers can capital-
ise on what they have learned when they pay for it.
Many countries have introduced standardised compe-
tence-based qualification systems, according to which
acquisition  of  qualifications  is  not  conditioned  to
course attendance in vocational training or educational
institutions. Under these systems, workers are allowed
to take individual skill tests independently of the way
skills are acquired. Yet, much remains to be done to
ensure  the  correct  functioning  of  these  mechanisms
(Bjørnåvold, 2002).
Collective  agreements  and  trade  union  participation
may play an important role not only in diffusing infor-
mation  and  jointly  defining  curricula,  but  also  by
increasing  and  twisting  employers’  supply  towards
more general types of training (see Ok and Tergeist,
2003). For example, a study by the American Society
for Training and Development (ASTD) of major joint
labour-management training programmes suggests that
these joint initiatives do result in a different mix of
training activities. While only 2 % of firm-supported
training addresses basic literacy skills according to the
ASTD’s benchmarking database, this figure soars to
15 % for the joint programmes (van Buren and Erskine,
2002). The sharing of training costs between employers
and individuals can also be fostered by joint training
agreements to the extent that unions and work councils
are in a better place to monitor training content and
quality. In most European countries, participation in
employer-sponsored training is significantly greater in
firms with a joint training agreement than in firms with-
out it (Chart 5). Differences in training participation
rates are particularly large in Mediterranean countries
(for which the participation rate in firms with negoti-
ated agreements is more than twice as large as in other
firms). Conversely, these differences are not particu-
larly significant in the Nordic countries (except Fin-
land) and the United Kingdom, where however training
participation rates are also high in firms without joint
training agreements.
Finally, other framework conditions, whose primary
effect is not on training or education, have second-
order (and theoretically more ambiguous) effects on
training demand and supply. For instance, institutions
in  the  labour  market  affecting  the  distribution  of
wages, such as the minimum wage and employment
protection  legislation,  modify  the  incentives  of
employers  and  employees  to  invest  in  training  (see
Acemoglu and Pischke, 1999b). Furthermore, the pro-
gressiveness of the income tax may have a bearing on
individual incentives, to the extent that, on the one
hand, it reduces individual appropriability of the ben-
efits from training and, on the other hand, it reduces
the opportunity cost of taking unpaid training leaves or
opting for part-time work. Finally, a major obstacle for
women to participate in adult learning is represented
by the fact that the burden of family responsibilities is
still  unevenly  shared  within  the  couple  (OECD,
2003a). Policies that affect the ability of households to
reconcile work with family needs can have an impact
on the gender-training gap.Par t   II I:  Adult   educat i on  and t r aini ng
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Chart 5:  Training participation and joint training agreements — 
Percentage of employees in all enterprises with/without a joint training agreement with 
social partners participating in employer-sponsored training, 1999 (1)
(1)  Countries are ranked from left to right in descending order of the percentage of employees in all enterprises with a joint training agreement participating
in employer-sponsored training.
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  Coefficient of variation  0.24  0.42132
5. Concluding remarks
James Heckman has argued that ‘in evaluating a human
capital investment strategy, it is crucial to consider the
entire policy portfolio of interventions together (training
programmes, school-based policies, school reform, and
early interventions) rather than focusing on one type of
policy in isolation from the others. […] We cannot afford
to postpone investing in children until they become adults,
nor can we wait until they reach school age — a time
when  it  may  be  too  late  to  intervene.  Learning  is  a
dynamic process and is most effective when it begins at a
young age and continues through to adulthood’ (Heck-
man, 2000, p. 50). This caveat has an irreplaceable impor-
tance for policy guidance. Nevertheless, as noted by Blun-
dell (2000), Heckman’s remarks do not imply that later
interventions have no pay-off. There are indeed several
reasons  why  systematic  provision  of  front-end  formal
education and training preceding entry to the labour mar-
ket is increasingly insufficient and it might be desirable to
flank early interventions with policies for adult learning.
This paper has provided evidence that training has a posi-
tive  impact  on  individual  labour  market  performance.
Despite this evidence, in the absence of policy interven-
tions, training might be suboptimally provided because of
imperfections  in  labour,  capital  and  training  markets.
However, carefully designed co-financing mechanisms,
by leveraging the resources of all actors that can benefit
from  training,  could  promise  policy  innovations  to
improve training outcomes, as appropriate.133
6. Appendix
The analysis of this paper is limited to individuals aged
from 25 to 54 years. Due to data availability a person is
defined as employed if he/she works at least 15 hours per
week.  Moreover,  employees’  gross  hourly  wages  are
computed from gross monthly earnings in the main job
at the date of the interview, by dividing them by 52/12
and by usual weekly hours of work. Overtime pay and
hours are included.
The question on employment security in the ECHP is
as follows: ‘How satisfied are you with your present
job in terms of job security?’. Replies are quantified
on a 1–6 Likert scale from not satisfied to fully satis-
fied. The median reply in the sample is 4, while the
mode is 5.
The ECHP release used in this paper contains data from
1994 to 2000. Although, in principle, the ECHP covers
15 European Union countries, the country sample in the
different analyses is chosen on the basis of data availa-
bility. Luxembourg and Sweden never appear in the
analysis — due to the small sample size for the former
and  the  absence  of  longitudinal  data  for  the  latter.
SOEP and BHPS sources are preferred for Germany
and the United Kingdom, respectively, since data from
ECHP sources on these two countries are not available
after 1996. Nevertheless, due to a change in the BHPS
questionnaire, starting in 1998, only the waves 1998–
2000 are used for the United Kingdom; and due to the
lack of information on subjective perceptions of job
security in the SOEP, ECHP data are used for Germany
in that analysis. Furthermore, data for Austria are not
available in 1994 and data for Finland are not available
in 1994 and 1995. In addition, observations for certain
countries and certain years are excluded from the sam-
ple due to the lack of time-series comparability of wage
data — notably, 1995 for Austria, 1994 and 1997–2000
for France, 1994–96 for Greece, 2000 for Ireland, and
1994 for Spain. Finally, employment security data are
not available for Ireland.134
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